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Qualified fiscal-governance analysis · 23 August 2026

24-Hour Markets: flagship investment or a reallocation of Ghana's district development funds?

Modern markets may support extended commerce, but the 25% DACF earmark raises questions about local discretion, funding additionality and whether infrastructure delivery will generate genuine economic outcomes.

Core distinction
A completed market is an implementation output—not evidence that the 24-Hour Economy has succeeded.

Success requires attributable increases in sustainable trading hours, transactions, employment, productivity, market access and reduced supply-chain losses. None of those outcomes is yet established.

Executive assessment

The financing mechanism changes how the flagship programme should be judged.

Government requires 25% of money transferred to Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies through the District Assemblies Common Fund to finance the design and construction of 24-Hour Economy Model Markets.

The question is not whether Ghana needs better markets. It is whether a national programme represents additional investment or an earmark within resources assemblies would otherwise apply to competing local priorities—and whether the resulting buildings will produce commercially sustainable extended-hours activity.

Fiscal scale

The 25% earmark is verified and financially material.

Implied market figures are arithmetic estimates—not verified expenditure, contracts or disbursements.

  1. 01

    2025: ≈GH¢7.57bn DACF allocation; ≈GH¢6.1bn stated direct transfer.

    ≈GH¢1.53bn implied 25% earmark
  2. 02

    2026: ≈GH¢8.76bn DACF allocation; ≈GH¢7.01bn if the 80% rule continues.

    ≈GH¢1.75bn implied 25% earmark

Additionality and discretion

More money may reach assemblies while local choice still narrows.

Overall DACF allocations increased between 2025 and 2026. GPEx therefore does not conclude that assemblies necessarily receive less money in absolute terms because of the programme.

No separate market-specific addition to assemblies' discretionary DACF resources has been identified. The more precise concern is that a larger transfer can coexist with reduced authority over a material share of it.

Policy evolution

The reviewed manifesto does not clearly establish a uniform market in every district.

The Presidency subsequently described the Model Markets as a campaign promise.

The reviewed 2024 manifesto material presents the 24-Hour Economy as a production, employment and productivity strategy. It includes retail centres and enabling infrastructure but does not clearly identify a standardised Model Market for every district. A campaign commitment may have appeared in speeches or other materials.

GPEx therefore does not conclude that the programme lacked electoral basis. The evidence instead leaves the policy chain insufficiently documented: original commitment, identified implementation problem, appraisal of alternatives, decision to construct markets, financing architecture and intended outcomes.

Implementation evidence

Construction is verified in selected districts—not uniformly nationwide.

Sod cutting, site handover, procurement, construction and commissioning are separate stages.

Official reporting confirms construction activity at Bimbilla and Kukuo. Other assemblies have handed over sites or included Model Markets in composite budgets, while some budget records describe projects at concept-note or pre-feasibility stage. A complete national implementation register has not been located.

The programme is therefore classified as selected construction verified; wider procurement, budgeting and preparation underway; nationwide delivery not independently established.

Delivery risk

DACF financing has a documented exposure to stalled projects.

Recent Auditor-General reporting identified advance mobilisation payments for 13 district projects delayed for periods ranging from 13 to 60 months. This does not establish that Model Markets will suffer the same fate, but it makes predictable releases, procurement control and contract monitoring central to the programme's credibility.

Accountability architecture

Distributed implementation risks diluted responsibility.

The 24H+ Secretariat says it does not exercise jurisdictional control over the markets.

01

Political ownership

Government and the Presidency own the national flagship identity and its public commitments.

02

Programme delivery

The Local Government Ministry, Regional Coordinating Councils, assemblies and contractors share financing, procurement and construction responsibilities.

03

Outcome ownership

No single published accountability mechanism consolidates cost, construction and economic outcomes across the programme.

Constitutional position

The legality of fixed expenditure percentages remains unresolved.

GPEx does not conclude that the 25% allocation is unconstitutional or unlawful.

Article 252 gives Parliament responsibility for approving the formula used to distribute the DACF. Section 126(3) of the Local Governance Act, 2016 also permits the Local Government Minister, in consultation with the Finance Minister, to determine categories of expenditure within approved district development budgets.

The unresolved issue is whether prescribing fixed percentages after parliamentary approval is an ordinary expenditure guideline or an alteration requiring further parliamentary authority. Competing interpretations have been recorded in Parliament; no authoritative legal determination reviewed by GPEx settles the question.

Transparency correction

The published utilisation percentages do not presently reconcile.

The Finance Ministry statement lists administration, monitoring and evaluation at 7.5%, causing its published schedule to total 102.5%. Parliament's account uses 5%, producing 100%. The discrepancy may be a transcription error, but a multibillion-cedi programme requires one corrected, authoritative schedule.

Viability test

Infrastructure should follow evidence of local economic value.

A national brand should not replace district-level appraisal.

  1. 01

    Need: the deficiency in existing market infrastructure that the project will address.

    Required
  2. 02

    Demand: sufficient commercial activity to sustain extended operating hours.

    Required
  3. 03

    Additionality: genuinely new economic activity rather than relocation from an existing market.

    Required
  4. 04

    Opportunity cost: the alternative district investments considered and displaced.

    Required
  5. 05

    Supporting infrastructure: electricity, transport, water, sanitation, security and logistics.

    Required
  6. 06

    Financial sustainability: responsibility for operations and maintenance costs.

    Required
  7. 07

    Local ownership: evidence that traders, communities and assemblies influenced project selection and design.

    Required
  8. 08

    Outcomes: measurable changes expected after commissioning.

    Required

Outcome framework

GPEx will track the programme from funding to attributable impact.

A completed building alone will not be scored as policy success.

  1. 01

    Input: DACF allocation and actual cash release

    Implementation
  2. 02

    Activity: Appraisal, procurement and construction

    Implementation
  3. 03

    Output: Completed and commissioned market

    Implementation
  4. 04

    Intermediate outcome: Occupancy and extended operating hours

    Outcome
  5. 05

    Policy outcome: Additional employment, transactions, productivity, market access and reduced supply-chain losses attributable to the intervention

    Outcome

Time-series and foresight

Insufficient data—no forecast.

No consistent national series exists for releases, costs, physical progress or post-opening performance.

01

Improvement

Reliable releases, demand-tested locations, timely completion and measurable extended-hours activity.

02

Baseline

Uneven construction progress and commercially viable operations concentrated in stronger trading centres.

03

Adverse

Delayed releases, cost escalation, unfinished projects, displaced local priorities and weak nighttime demand.

GPEx judgement

A national infrastructure programme whose local opportunity costs and economic outcomes remain unproven.

Model Markets may support extended activity where commercial demand and complementary services justify them. Total DACF allocations have increased, but no separate market-specific top-up to assemblies' discretionary resources has been demonstrated, and a mandatory national percentage limits local choice.

The rating is Amber–Red. It reflects material fiscal-governance, delivery and accountability risks—not a conclusion that the programme will fail. Construction is verified in selected districts; additional employment, transactions, productivity and reduced supply-chain losses are not yet verified.

What GPEx will watch

From DACF release to sustained local economic activity

The tracker will preserve the distinction between expenditure, delivery, use and impact.

  1. 01

    The corrected and authoritative DACF utilisation schedule.

    Monitor
  2. 02

    Actual quarterly DACF releases and district-by-district market allocations.

    Monitor
  3. 03

    A national project register separating appraisal, procurement, contract award, construction and commissioning.

    Monitor
  4. 04

    Individual contract values, expenditure, variations and completion dates.

    Monitor
  5. 05

    Alternative district projects deferred or displaced by the earmark.

    Monitor
  6. 06

    Feasibility studies, demand evidence and trader consultation.

    Monitor
  7. 07

    Electricity, transport, security, sanitation, storage and logistics provision.

    Monitor
  8. 08

    Occupancy, actual operating hours and nighttime transaction volumes.

    Monitor
  9. 09

    Employment and supply-chain outcomes before and after commissioning.

    Monitor
  10. 10

    The institution accountable for projects that fail to achieve their stated economic outcomes.

    Monitor

Source trail

Primary policy, financing and institutional records

Official announcements verify actions and positions—not the programme's eventual economic effectiveness.